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Healthcare systems across the globe are struggling with increasing costs and worsening outcomes. This 
presents those responsible for overseeing healthcare with a challenge. Increasingly, policymakers, 
politicians, clinical entrepreneurs and computer and data scientists argue that a key part of the solution 
will be ‘Artificial Intelligence’ (AI) – particularly Machine Learning (ML). This argument stems not 
from the belief that all healthcare needs will soon be taken care of by “robot doctors.” Instead, it is an 
argument that rests on the classic counterfactual definition of AI as an umbrella term for a range of 
techniques that can be used to make machines complete tasks in a way that would be considered 
intelligent were they to be completed by a human. Automation of this nature could offer great 
opportunities for the improvement of healthcare services and ultimately patients’ health by 
significantly improving human clinical capabilities in diagnosis, drug discovery, epidemiology, 
personalised medicine, and operational efficiency. However, if these AI solutions are to be embedded 
in clinical practice, then at least three issues need to be considered: the technical possibilities and 
limitations; the ethical, regulatory and legal framework; and the governance framework. In this article, 
we report on the results of a systematic analysis designed to provide a clear overview of the second of 
these elements: the ethical, regulatory and legal framework. We find that ethical issues arise at six levels 
of abstraction (individual, interpersonal, group, institutional, sectoral, and societal) and can be 
categorised as epistemic, normative, or overarching. We conclude by stressing how important it is that 
the ethical challenges raised by implementing AI in healthcare settings are tackled proactively rather than 








Healthcare systems across the globe are struggling with increasing costs and worsening outcomes 
(Topol, 2019). This presents those responsible for overseeing healthcare systems with a ‘wicked 
problem’, meaning that the problem has multiple causes, is hard to understand and define, and hence 
will have to be tackled from multiple different angles. Against this background, policymakers, 
politicians, clinical entrepreneurs and computer and data scientists increasingly argue that a key part of 
the solution will be ‘Artificial Intelligence’ (AI), particularly Machine Learning (Chin-Yee & Upshur, 
2019). The argument stems not from the belief that all healthcare needs will soon be taken care of by 
“robot doctors” (Chin-Yee & Upshur, 2019). Instead, the argument rests on the classic counterfactual 
definition of AI as an umbrella term for a range of techniques (summarised in Figure 1 below) that 
can be used to make machines complete tasks in a way that would be considered intelligent were they 
to be completed by a human. For example1, as mapped by (Harerimana, Jang, Kim, & Park, 2018), 
decision tree techniques can be used to diagnose breast cancer tumours (Kuo, Chang, Chen, & Lee, 
2001); Support Vector Machine techniques can be used to classify genes (Brown et al., 2000) and 
diagnose Diabetes Mellitus (Barakat, Bradley, & Barakat, 2010); ensemble learning methods can predict 
outcomes for cancer patients (Kourou, Exarchos, Exarchos, Karamouzis, & Fotiadis, 2015); and 
neural networks can be used to recognise human movement (Jiang & Yin, 2015). From this 
perspective, AI represents a growing resource of interactive, autonomous, and often self-learning (in the 
machine learning sense, see Figure 1) agency, that can be used on demand (Floridi, 2019), presenting 
the opportunity for potentially transformative cooperation between machines and doctors (Bartoletti, 
2019). 
 
1 For a full overview of all supervised and unsupervised Machine Learning techniques and their applications in 
healthcare, see Harerimana, Jang, Kim, & Park, 2018 and for a detailed look at the number of papers related to 
AI techniques and their clinical applications see (Tran et al., 2019) 
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Figure 1. AI Knowledge Map (AIKM). Source: Corea (2019), reproduced with permission courtesy 
of F. Corea. 
 
 
If harnessed effectively, such AI-clinician coordination (AI-Health) could offer great opportunities for 
the improvement of healthcare services and ultimately patients’ health (Taddeo & Floridi, 2018) by 
significantly improving human clinical capabilities in diagnosis (Arieno, Chan, & Destounis, 2019; De 
Fauw et al., 2018; Kunapuli et al., 2018), drug discovery (Álvarez-Machancoses & Fernández-Martínez, 
2019; Fleming, 2018), epidemiology (Hay, George, Moyes, & Brownstein, 2013), personalised medicine 
(Barton et al., 2019; Cowie, Calveley, Bowers, & Bowers, 2018; Dudley, Listgarten, Stegle, Brenner, & 
Parts, 2015) or operational efficiency (H. Lu & Wang, 2019; Nelson, Herron, Rees, & Nachev, 2019). 
However, as Ngiam & Khor (2019) stress, if these AI solutions are to be embedded in clinical practice, 
then at least three issues need to be considered: the technical possibilities and limitations; the ethical, 
regulatory and legal framework; and the governance framework.  
The task of the following pages is to focus on the second of these elements — the ethical, 
regulatory and legal framework — by stressing how important it is that the ethical challenges raised by 
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implementing AI in healthcare settings are tackled proactively (Char, Shah, & Magnus, 2018). If they are 
not, there is a risk of incurring significant opportunity costs (Cookson, 2018) due to what Floridi terms 
a ‘double bottleneck’ whereby “a double bottleneck: ethical mistakes or misunderstandings may lead 
to social rejection and/or distorted legislation and policies, which in turn may cripple the acceptance 
and advancement of [the necessary] data science”.2 Although essential, encouraging this kind of 
proactive ethical analysis is challenging because – although bioethical principles for clinical research 
and healthcare are well established, and issues related to privacy, effectiveness, accessibility and utility 
are clear (Nebeker, Torous, & Bartlett Ellis, 2019) – other issues are less obvious (Char et al., 2018). 
For example, AI processes may lack transparency, making accountability problematic, or may be 
biased, and leading to unfair behaviour or mistaken decisions (Mittelstadt, Allo, Taddeo, Wachter, & 
Floridi, 2016). Identification of these less obvious concerns requires input from the medical sciences, 
economics, computer sciences, social sciences, law, and policy-making. Yet, research in these areas is 
currently happening in siloes, is overly focused on individual level impacts (Morley & Floridi, 2019b), 
or does not consider the fact that the ethical concerns may vary depending on the stage of the 
algorithm development pipeline (Morley, Floridi, Kinsey, & Elhalal, 2019). Taken together, these issues 
are inhibiting the development of a coherent ethical framework. 
Whilst AI-Health remains in the early stages of development and relatively far away from 
having a major impact on frontline clinical care (Panch, Mattie, & Celi, 2019) there is still time to 
develop this framework. However, this window of opportunity is closing fast, as the pace at which AI-
Health solutions are gaining approval for use in clinical care in the US is accelerating (Topol, 2019). 
Both the Chinese (Zhang, Wang, Li, Zhao, & Zhan, 2018) and British governments (Department of 
Health and Social Care, 2019) have made it very clear that they intend on investing heavily in the spread 
and adoption of AI-Health technologies. It is for these reasons that the goal of this article is to offer 
a cross-disciplinary systematic review mapping the potential ethical implications of the development 
of AI-Health in order to support the development of better design practices, and transparent and 
accountable deployment strategies. We will do this in terms of digital ethics. That is, we will focus on 
the evaluation of moral problems related to data, algorithms and corresponding practices (Floridi & 
Taddeo, 2016), with the hope of enabling governments and healthcare systems looking to adopt AI-




2 https://digitalethicslab.oii.ox.ac.uk/the-ethics-of-medical-data-analytics-opportunities-and-challenges/  
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2. Methodology in Brief 
 
A detailed outline of the methodology used to conduct the review can be found in the appendix. For 
now, suffice to say that a traditional thematic review methodology (following Abdul, Vermeulen, 
Wang, Lim, & Kankanhalli, 2018) was used to find literature from across disciplinary boundaries that 
highlighted ethical issues unique to the use of AI algorithms in healthcare. This means that the review 
did not focus on issues such as lack of evidence, privacy and security (Vayena, Tobias, Afua, & 
Allesandro, 2018), or definitions and secondary uses of healthcare data, as these are ethical issues for 
digital health at large and not unique to AI. More detailed discussion of these issues is highlighted in 
Table 1.  
 
General Digital Health Ethical Concern Example References   
Data Sharing/Data Privacy   (Kalkman, Mostert, Gerlinger, Van Delden, & Van Thiel, 
2019)(Olimid, Rogozea, & Olimid, 2018) (Parker, Halter, 
Karliychuk, & Grundy, 2019)(Quinn, 2017) (Richardson, Milam, 
& Chrysler, 2015) (Townend, 2018) 
Secondary use of Healthcare Data (Lee, 2017) (Nittas, Mütsch, Ehrler, & Puhan, 2018) (O’Doherty 
et al., 2016)  
Surveillance, Nudging and Paternalism (Maher et al., 2019) (Marill, 2019)(Nebeker et al., 2017) (Morley & 
Floridi, 2019d)(Burr, Mariarosaria, & Floridi, 2019) 
Consent  (S. Millett & O’Leary, 2015) (T. Ploug & Holm, 2016) (Mann, 
Savulescu, & Sahakian, 2016) (Balthazar, Harri, Prater, & Safdar, 
2018) 
Definition of Health Data  (Floridi et al., 2018) (Voigt, 2019) (Holzinger, Haibe-Kains, & 
Jurisica, 2019) (Kleinpeter, 2017) 
Ownership of Health Data  (Chiauzzi & Wicks, 2019) (Krutzinna, Taddeo, & Floridi, 2018) 
(Shaw, Gross, & Erren, 2016) (Sterckx, Rakic, Cockbain, & 
Borry, 2016) (Stephan Millett & O’Leary, 2015) 
Embodied Intelligence/Robotics (Fiske, Henningsen, & Buyx, 2019) 
Digital Divide/eHealth Literacy  (Celi et al., 2016) (Kuek & Hakkennes, 2019) 
Patient involvement  (Aitken et al., 2019) (Page, Manhas, & Muruve, 2016) 
Patient Safety  (Barras, 2019) 
Evidence of Efficacy  (Ferretti, Ronchi, & Vayena, 2019) (Henson, David, Albright, & 
Torous, 2019) (Larsen et al., 2019) 
Table 1: Example literature related to ethical concerns that are relevant for all digital health intervention, not unique to AI-Health and 
therefore not included in this review  
 
To ensure that the focus stayed on the unique ethical issues, the map, developed by (Mittelstadt et al., 
2016), of the epistemic, normative, and overarching ethical concerns related to algorithms was used as 
a base. First, the selected literature was reviewed to identify healthcare examples of each of the 
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concerns highlighted in the original map, as shown in Table 2, and then reviewed more thoroughly to 
identify how the ethical issues may vary depending on whether the analysis was being conducted at: (i) 
individual, (ii) interpersonal, (iii) group (e.g. family or population), (iv) institutional, (v) sectoral, and/or 
(v) societal levels of abstraction (LoA)3 (Floridi, 2008). This helped the review avoid the narrow focus 
on individual-level impacts highlighted in the introduction. This approach is not intended to imply that 
there is no overlap between the levels.    
 
 Ethical Concern  Explanation Medical Example 
Epistemic concerns  Inconclusive Evidence  Algorithmic outcomes (e.g. 
classification) are 
probabilistic and not 
infallible. They are rarely 
sufficient to posit the 
existence of a causal 
relationship. 
EKG readers in smartwatches may ‘diagnose’ a patient 
as suffering from arrhythmia when it may be due to a 
fault with the watch not being able to accurately read that 
user’s heartbeat (for example due to the colour of their 
skin) or the ‘norm’ is inappropriately calibrated for that 
individual (Hailu, 2019) 
Inscrutable Evidence  Recipients of an algorithmic 
decision very rarely have full 
oversight of the data used 
to train or test an algorithm 
or the data points used to 
reach a specific decision.  
 
A clinical decision support system deployed in a hospital 
may make a treatment recommendation, but it may not 
be clear on what basis it has made that ‘decision’ raising 
the risk that it has used data that are inappropriate for 
the individual in question or that there is a bug in the 
system leading to issues with over or under prescribing 
(Wachter, 2015).  
Misguided Evidence  Algorithmic outcomes can 
only be as reliable (but also 
as neutral) as the data they 
are based on.  
Watson for Oncology is in widespread use in China for 
‘diagnosis’ via image recognition but has primarily been 
trained on a Western data set leading to issues with 
concordance and poorer results for Chinese patients than 
their Western counterparts (Liu et al., 2018). 
Normative Concerns  Unfair outcomes  An action can be found to 
having more of an impact 
(positive or negative) on 
one group of people  
An algorithm ‘learns’ to prioritise patients it predicts to 
have better outcomes for a particular disease. This turns 
out to have a discriminatory effect on people within the 
Black and minority ethnic communities (Garattini, 
Raffle, Aisyah, Sartain, & Kozlakidis, 2019). 
Transformative effects  Algorithmic activities, like 
profiling, re-conceptualise 
reality in unexpected ways.  
 
An individual using personal health app has limited 
oversight over what passive data it is collecting and how 
that is being transformed into a recommendation to 
improve, limiting their ability to challenge any 
recommendations made and a loss of personal autonomy 
and data privacy (Kleinpeter, 2017).   
Overarching Traceability  Harm caused by algorithmic 
activity is hard to debug (to 
detect the harm and find its 
cause), and it is hard to 
identify who should be held 
responsible for the harm 
caused.  
If a decision made by clinical decision support software 
leads to a negative outcome for the individual, it is unclear 
who to assign the responsibility and or liability to and 
therefore to prevent it from happening again (Racine, 
Boehlen, & Sample, 2019)..  
 
Table 2: A summary of the epistemic, normative and overarching ethical concerns related to algorithmic use in healthcare based on 
Mittelstadt et al (2016) from (Jessica Morley & Floridi, In Press) .   
 
3 A level of abstraction can be imagined as an interface that enables one to observe some aspects of a system 
analysed, while making other aspects opaque or indeed invisible. For example, one may analyse a house at the 
LoA of a buyer, of an architect, of a city planner, of a plumber, and so on. LoAs are common in computer 
science, where systems are described at different LoAs (computational, hardware, user-centred etc.). Note that 
LoAs can be combined in more complex sets, and can be, but are not necessarily hierarchical, with higher or 
lower ‘resolution’ or granularity of information. 
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3. Thematic Analysis  
What follows is a detailed discussion of the issues uncovered. A summary table (Table 3) is provided 
at the end of the section.  
 
3.1. Epistemic Concerns: Inconclusive, Inscrutable, and Misguided Evidence  
Many factors are encouraging the development of AI-Health (Chin-Yee & Upshur, 2019). One of the 
main driving forces is the belief that algorithms can make more objective, robust and evidence-based 
clinical decisions (in terms of diagnosis, prognosis or treatment recommendations) than a human 
health care provider (HCP) can (Kalmady et al., 2019). This is not an unfounded position. Machine 
learning methods, especially ensemble and unsupervised methods (Harerimana et al., 2018), can take 
into account a far greater range of evidence (data) than a Health Care Provider (HCP) when making a 
clinical decision, including five of the seven dimensions of healthcare data provided by the US 
Department of Health and Human services: (1) demographic and socioeconomic data; (2) symptom 
and existing diagnosis data; (3) treatment data; (4) outcome data; and (5) other omic data  (Holzinger 
et al., 2019)4. If designed taking into account the multiple epistemic concerns, this ability enables 
clinical algorithms to act as digital companions (Morley & Floridi, 2019d), reducing the information 
asymmetry that exists between a HCP and the individual seeking care by making available information 
accessible to both parties and helping ensure that the most informed decision possible is made by the 
person who has the right to make it (Morley & Floridi, 2019a).  
 It is at least in part due to this ability to make ‘evidence-based’ decisions that, as AI-health 
research has shown, AI techniques can considerably augment or surpass human capabilities when it 
comes to tasks including: (1) analysis of risk factors (De Langavant, Bayen, & Yaffe, 2018; Deng, Luo, 
& Wang, 2018); (2) prediction of disease (Moscoso et al., 2019); (3) prediction of infection (Barton et 
al., 2019)(López-Martínez, Núñez-Valdez, Lorduy Gomez, & García-Díaz, 2019); (4) population 
health monitoring (F. S. Lu, Hattab, Clemente, Biggerstaff, & Santillana, 2019; Zacher & Czogiel, 
2019); (5) prediction of adverse effects (Ding, Tang, & Guo, 2019; Mortazavi et al., 2017); (6) 
prediction of outcome and/or likelihood of survival (Dong et al., 2019; Popkes et al., 2019; Topuz, 
Zengul, Dag, Almehmi, & Yildirim, 2018); and (7) analysing electronic health records (Shickel, Tighe, 
Bihorac, & Rashidi, 2018). These capabilities should not be underestimated, particularly as AI-Health 
solutions can operate at scale, diagnosing or predicting outcomes for multiple people at once – 
 
4 The other two categories refer to data from the Healthcare system, such as expenditure and healtchcare 
resources data. 
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something that an HCP could never do. Yet in many ways this almost unwavering faith in the truth-
telling power of AI-Health is flawed.  
 As has been highlighted multiple times in the wider ethical AI literature, the belief that 
algorithms are more objective than humans is a ‘carefully crafted myth’ (Gillespie, Boczkowski, & 
Foot, 2014), and just because an algorithm can recognise a pattern (for example) does not necessarily 
make it meaningful (Floridi, 2014). In the context of healthcare, existing methods and studies 
(potentially including those referenced) suffer from overfitting due to small numbers of samples, 
meaning that the majority of results (e.g. patterns of disease risk factors, or presence of disease) are 
inconclusive (Holzinger et al., 2019). This is a problem that is further magnified by the lack of 
reproducibility, and external validity, of results. AI-Health solutions are often untranslatable between 
different settings and rarely work in settings different to those in which the initial result was obtained 
(Vollmer, Mateen, Bohner, Király, Ghani, et al., 2018), raising serious questions about the scientific 
rigor of AI-Health and its safety (Vayena, Blasimme, & Cohen, 2018). Furthermore, the results can 
often be heavily value-laden, based on the definition of ‘healthy’ by influential people or powerful 
companies (McLaughlin, 2016). This raises a number of significant ethical concerns.  
 At the individual LoA there is considerable risk of misdiagnosis. This can happen in at least 
two ways: either, as highlighted in table 2, by an individual using a wearable device that has a bug, or 
is inappropriately calibrated for them could be ‘told’ that they are suffering from a health condition 
when they are not (or vice versa) or, an HCP relying on clinical decision support software (CDSS) 
(Ruckenstein & Schüll, 2017) could be given an inaccurate diagnosis or recommendation which they 
do not question due to a tendency to uncritically accept the decisions of automated systems (Challen 
et al., 2019). Moreover, this can have impacts in medical practice, causing overreliance on the machine 
diagnostics and deskilling of practitioners (Cabitza, Rasoini, & Gensini, 2017). Not only is this a risk 
for individuals, but it also reverses the advantage of AI-Health solutions being able to operate at scale 
by introducing the group LoA ethical concern of misdiagnosis or missed diagnosis happening 
repeatedly. Whilst an HCP might give one person the wrong diagnosis and then be corrected, a faulty 
algorithm, based on the misguided, inscrutable or inconclusive evidence could give the same wrong 
diagnosis to hundreds or thousands of people at a time (Topol, 2019). The scale of the problems is as 
large as the scale of the solutions. 
 Building on this, there are also ethical implications at the interpersonal LoA. HCP-patient 
relationships are primarily based on trust and empathy, and whilst AI-Health solutions can take over 
tasks that are more routine and standardised, they cannot reproduce the emotional virtues of which 
human HCPs are capable (Ngiam & Khor, 2019). Consequently, an over-reliance on the ‘quantitative’ 
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and objective evidence that fuels clinical algorithms (Cabitza et al., 2017) could discredit other forms 
of diagnosis (Rosenfeld et al., 2019) – a prominent concern in the case of clinical psychiatry 
(Burns, 2015) – and lead to the de-humanisation or impersonalisation of care provision (Juengst, 
McGowan, Fishman, & Settersten, 2016), from a service based on listening and theory to one based 
purely on categorisation (an issue that could again lead to a group LoA harm of group-profiling and 
associated discrimination by providers including insurers, see section 3.2.). Not only is this effectively 
‘paternalism in disguise’ (Juengst et al., 2016) but it could also lead to poorer health outcomes due to 
the lack of disconnect between pure medical evidence and actual behaviour change (Emanuel & 
Wachter, 2019).  
 Finally, scaling up to the institutional, sectoral and societal LoAs, there is the concern that 
public health decisions are increasingly made on predictive AI-Health algorithms, which too often rely 
on the same flawed assumptions as outlined above. Regarding these assumptions, consider what is by 
now a classic example: the Google Flu Trends monitoring of the influenza virus. The initial algorithm 
distorted the spread of the virus in the US (Vayena, Salathé, Madoff, & Brownstein, 2015). If policy 
decisions about where to deploy health resources are based on such poor-quality evidence, this could 
result in the waste of public funds (e.g., promoting vaccination campaigns where they are not needed), 
damage local economies (e.g., scaring away tourists from a region) – which would result in a positive 
feedback loop of less money available for public expenditure – and lead to poorer quality public 
healthcare provision and thus worse health outcomes for society at large. This worry is particularly 
paramount when it is considered that the ultimate ambition of AI-Health is to create a learning 
healthcare system where the ‘system’ is constantly learning from the data it receives on the 
performance of its interventions (Faden et al., 2013). Furthermore, it is worth noting that, at this 
juncture, the example offered above of Flu Trends does not represent the limits of Google’s interest 
– and that of its subsidiaries and its siblings under parent company Alphabet – in public health. As we 
discuss below, the engagement between Alphabet’s artificial intelligence subsidiary DeepMind and a 
major UK hospital has attracted the attention of data protection regulators, the press, and academics 
(Information Commissioner, 2018; Powles & Hodson, 2017). The challenge of ensuring that AI-
Health systems function accurately has in turn sparked debates about the appropriateness of sharing 
data between public and private entities. In response to claims that patient data transferred from the 
Royal Free Hospital to DeepMind was “far in excess of the requirements of those publicly stated 
needs” (Powles & Hodson, 2017), DeepMind representatives argued that “data processed in the 
application have been defined by and are currently being used by clinicians for the direct monitoring 
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and care of AKI [acute kidney injury] patients” (King et al., 2018). Powles and Hodson responded in 
turn that it is a “statement of fact that the data transferred is broader than the requirements of AKI” 
(Powles & Hodson, 2018). As this series of claims and counter-claims demonstrates, the quality and 
quantity of data required for a particular AI-Health application is likely to be a matter of dispute in the 
context of the collection and sharing of patient data in training AI-Health. 
Ultimately, data is necessary for medical practice and thus so are AI-Health solutions that can 
take in greater volumes of data. But data collected and used in this way is insufficient to inform medical 
practice; it must be transformed to be useful (Car, Sheikh, Wicks, & Williams, 2019) and if this 
transformation process is flawed the results could be hugely damaging, resulting in either wasted funds 
and poorer health provision, or undue sharing of patient data with private sector actors under the guise 
of AI-Health.  
 
3.2. Normative Concerns: Unfair Outcomes and Transformative Effects  
As referenced in the introduction, healthcare systems across the globe are struggling with increasing 
costs and decreasing outcomes (Topol, 2019) and their administrators increasingly believe that the 
answer may well lie in making healthcare systems more informationally mature  and able to capitalise 
on the opportunities presented by AI-Health significantly to improve outcomes for patients, and to 
reduce the burdens on the system (Cath, Wachter, Mittelstadt, Taddeo, & Floridi, 2017). Whilst it 
would be ethically remiss to ignore these opportunities (Floridi, 2019a), it would be equally ethically 
problematic to ignore the fact that these opportunities are not created by AI-Health technologies per 
se but by their ability to re-ontologise (that is, fundamentally transform the intrinsic nature of) the ways in 
which health care is delivered by coupling, re-coupling and de-coupling different parts of the system 
(Floridi, 2017a). For example (Morley & Floridi, 2019b):  
• Coupling: patients and their data are so strictly and interchangeably linked that the 
patients are their genetic profiles, latest blood results, personal information, allergies 
etc. (Floridi, 2017a). What the legislation calls ‘data subjects” become “data patients”; 
• Re-Coupling: research and practice have been sharply divided since the publication 
of the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects in the 1970s, but 
in the digital scenario described above, they are re-joined as one and the same again 
(Petrini, 2015) (Faden et al., 2013); 
• De-Coupling: presence of Health Care Provider (HCP) and location of Patient 
become independent, for example because of the introduction of online consultations 
(NHS England, 2019).  
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As a result of these transformations a number of ethical concerns arise.  
Starting once again with the individual LoA: as more diagnostic and therapeutic interventions 
become based on AI-Health solutions, individuals may be encouraged to share more and more 
personal data about themselves (Racine et al., 2019) — data that can then be used in opaque ways 
(Sterckx et al., 2016). This means that the ability for individuals to be meaningfully involved in shared 
decision making is considerably undermined (Vayena et al., 2018) As a result, the increasing use of 
algorithmic decision-making in clinical settings can have negative implications for individual 
autonomy, as for an individual to be able to exert agency over the AI-Health derived clinical decision, 
they would need to have a good understanding of the underlying data, processes and technical 
possibilities that were involved in it being reached (DuFault & Schouten, 2018) and be able to ensure 
their own values are taken into consideration (McDougall, 2019). The vast majority of the population 
do not have the level of eHealth literacy necessary for this (Kim & Xie, 2017), and those that do 
(including HCPs) are prevented from gaining this understanding due to the black-box nature of AI-
Health algorithms (Watson et al., 2019). In extreme instances, this could undermine an individual’s 
confidence in their ability to refuse treatment (Thomas Ploug & Holm, 2019). Such issues pose a 
substantial threat to an individual’s integrity of self (the ability of an individual to understand the forces 
acting on them) (Cheney-Lippold, 2017). Given that damage to a person’s psychological integrity can 
be perceived as a ‘harm’, not accounting for this potentiality poses the risk of creating a system that 
violates the first principle of medical ethics: primum non nocere (“first, do no harm”) (Andorno, 2004; 
Morley & Floridi, 2019d).  
It is not necessarily the case that harmful impacts will primarily be felt by the patients. At the 
interpersonal LoA, HCPs may themselves feel increasingly left ‘out of the loop’ as decisions are made 
by patients and their ‘clinical advice’ algorithm in a closed digital loop (Nag, Pandey, Oh, & Jain, 2017). 
As a result, HCPs may too feel unable to exert their own agency over the decision-making capacity of 
AI-Health solutions. Though the use of algorithmic decision-making makes diagnostics seem like a 
straightforward activity of identifying symptoms and fitting them into textbook categories, medical 
practice is much less clear-cut than it seems (Cabitza et al., 2017). Clinical practice involves a series of 
evaluations, trial and error, and a dynamic interaction with the patient and the medical literature. As a 
result, formal treatment protocols should be seen more as evaluative guidelines than well-defined, 
isolated categories. AI-Health solutions may not be in accordance with current best practice, which is 
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necessary to handle the great degree of uncertainty5 and can only be fully evaluated by physicians 
(Cabitza et al., 2017).  Therefore, AI-Health solutions need to allow HCPs to exert influence in the 
decision-making process.   
At the group LoA the concern is that AI-Health systems may well be able to cope better with 
illnesses and injuries that have well-established and fairly set (and therefore automatable) treatment 
protocols. These are more likely to exist for afflictions most commonly suffered by white men as there 
is a greater volume of medical trials data for this group than there is for almost any other group. 
Algorithms trained on such biased datasets could make considerably poorer predictions for, for 
example, younger black women (Vayena et al., 2018). If HCPs are left out of the loop completely and 
learning healthcare systems primarily rely on automated decisions, there is considerable potential to 
exacerbate existing inequalities between the “haves” and the “have-nots” of the digital healthcare 
ecosystem, i.e., those that generate enough data on themselves to ensure accurately trained algorithms 
and those that do not (Topol, 2019).   
To mitigate these and associated risks, institutions need to be asking the crucial question: 
how much clinical decision-making should we be delegating to AI-Health solutions (Di Nucci, 2019)? 
If it is known that algorithms which enable profiling (e.g. those that determine genetic risk profiles) 
can ignore outliers and provide the basis for discrimination (Garattini et al., 2019), so deciding whether 
healthcare also ought to be a means to promote social justice is crucial in order to establish what type 
of data services will be embedded in the system (Voigt, 2019), what data should be collected, and 
which values should be embedded in algorithmic decision-making services (McDougall, 2019). This 
decision also determines what sort of population-level behavioural change the health system should 
be able to aim for depending on cost management, data collection and fairness in data-driven systems 
(Department of Health and Social Care, 2018.). If not carefully considered, this process of 
transforming the provision of care risks over-fitting the system to a specific set of values that may not 
represent those of society at large (McDougall, 2019).  
Another, more subtle yet pervasive transformative effect arises at the sectoral level. Powles 
& Hodson (2017) argue that one risk that may arise from collaboration between public and private 
sector entities such as that between the Royal Free London hospital and DeepMind is that the positive 
 
5 Here we are discussing fairly routine illnesses and injuries that have set treatment protocols that may need to 
be flexibly interpreted on a case-by-case basis. We recognize that there are other instances, such as in the case 
of rare diseases, where algorithmic systems might be better equipped to deal with diagnostic uncertainty (for 
example in cases of rare disesaes) by being able to draw on a wider range of data points and information 
sources than a human clinician could. 
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benefits of AI-Health “solutions” will be siloed within private entities. They note that in the Royal 
Free case, “DeepMind [was given] a lead advantage in developing new algorithmic tools on otherwise 
privately-held, but publicly-generated datasets” (Powles & Hodson, 2017, p. 362). This, they suggest, 
may mean that the only feasible way that future advances may be developed is “via DeepMind on 
DeepMind’s terms”. This interpretation was contested by DeepMind, who called it “unevidenced and 
untrue” and claimed that the Information Commissioner agreed with their stance in her 2018 ruling 
(King et al., 2018). Whatever the circumstances of this particular case, the broader risk of privately 
held AI-Health solutions – trained on datasets that have been generated about the public by public 
actors but then (lawfully) shared with private companies – is worthy of caution going forward.  
 As may now be clear, these transformative effects also have significant ethical implications at 
the societal LoA. Before institutions can establish where and how (and, from the sectoral perspective, 
whether) AI-Health solutions can improve care, society itself must make difficult decisions about what 
care is and what constitutes good care (Coeckelberg, 2014). To offer a simplistic example, does it mean 
purely providing a technical diagnosis and an appropriate prescription or does it involve contemplating 
a series of human necessities that revolve around well-being (Burr, Taddeo, & Floridi, 2019)? If it is 
the former, then it is relatively easy to automate the role of non-surgical clinicians through AI (although 
this does not imply that doctors should be substituted by AI systems). However, if is the latter, then 
providing good health care means encompassing psychological wellbeing and other elements related 
to quality of life, which would make human interaction an essential part of healthcare provision, as a 
machine does not have the capability to make emotionally-driven decisions. Consequently, certain 
decisions may completely exceed the machine’s capabilities and thus delegating these tasks to AI-
Health would be ethically concerning (Matthias, 2015).  
Consider, for example, a situation where an AI-Health solution decides which patients are 
sent to the Intensive Care Unit (ICU). Intensive care is a limited resource and only people who are at 
risk of losing their lives or suffering grave harms are sent there. Triage decisions are currently made by 
humans with the aim of maximising well-being for the greatest number of people. Doctors weigh 
different factors when making this decision, including the likelihood of people surviving if they are 
sent to the ICU. These situations often involve practitioners (implicitly) taking moral stances, by 
prioritising individuals based on their age or health conditions. These cases are fundamentally oriented 
by legal norms and medical deontology, yet personal expertise, experience and values also inevitably 
play a role. Having the support of AI-Health in the ICU screening increases the number of agents and 
complicates the norms involved in these decisions, since the doctor may follow his or her professional 
guidelines, while the algorithm will be oriented by the values embedded in its code. Unless there is a 
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transparent process for society to be involved in the weighing of values embedded in these decision-
making tools (for instance, how is ‘fair’ provision of care defined?) (Cohen, Amarasingham, Shah, Xie, 
& Lo, 2014), then the use of algorithms in such scenarios could result in the overfitting of the health 
system to a specific set of values that are not representative of society at large.  
In response to this risk, some attempts have already been made to involve the public at large 
in decisions over the design and deployment of AI systems. In early 2019, the UK’s Information 
Commissioner’s Office and the National Institute for Health Research staged a series of “citizens’ 
juries” to obtain the opinions of a representative cross-section of British society regarding the use of 
AI in health (Information Commissioner, 2019). The “juries” were presented with four scenarios, two 
relating to health — using AI to diagnose strokes, and using it to find potential matches for a kidney 
transplant — and another two relating to criminal justice. Notably, the juries “strongly favoured 
accuracy over explanation” in the two scenarios involving AI in health (National Institute for Health 
Research, 2019). This is just one example of research which attempted to obtain public opinion data 
regarding AI in health, and there are reasons to suppose that the apparent preference among 
participants for accurate over explainable AI systems reflects the high-stakes and fast-moving scenarios 
that were presented (as opposed to, say, the more routine illnesses and injuries we are focusing on 
here). Nonetheless, it demonstrates the plausibility and preferability of involving the public in 
designing AI-Health systems. 
To conclude this sub-section, the notion that AI-Health technologies are ethically neutral is 
unrealistic, and having them perform moral decision-making and enforcement may provoke immoral 
and unfair results (Rajkomar, Hardt, Howell, Corrado, & Chin, 2018). The direct involvement of the 
public in the design of AI-Health may help mitigate these risks. This should be borne in mind by all 
those involved in the AI-driven transformation of healthcare systems.  
 
3.3 Overarching Concerns: Traceability  
The previous sub-section outlined how the increasing use of AI-Health is fundamentally transforming 
the delivery of healthcare and the ethical implications of this process, particularly in terms of potentially 
unfair outcomes. This transformation process means that healthcare systems now rely on a dynamic, 
cyclical and intertwined series  of interactions between human, artificial and hybrid agents (Vollmer, 
Mateen, Bohner, Király, & Ghani, 2018)(Turilli & Floridi, 2009). This is making it increasingly 
challenging identify interaction-emerging risks and allocate liability, raising ethical concerns with 
regards to moral responsibility.  
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Moral responsibility involves both looking forward, where an individual, group or 
organisation is perceived as being in charge of guaranteeing a desired outcome, and looking backwards 
to appropriate blame and possibly redress, when a failure has occurred (Wardrope, 2015). In a well-
functioning healthcare system, this responsibility is distributed evenly and transparently across all 
nodes so that the causal chain of a given outcome can be easily replicated in the case of a positive 
outcome, or prevented from repeating in the case of a negative outcome (Floridi, 2013, 2016). In an 
algorithmically-driven healthcare system, a single AI diagnostic tool might involve many people 
organising, collecting and brokering data, and performing analyses on it, making this transparent 
allocation of responsibility almost impossible. In essence, not only is the decision-making process of 
a single algorithm a black-box, but the entire chain of actors that participate in the end product of AI-
Health solutions is extremely complex. This makes the entire AI-Health ecosystem inaccessible and 
opaque, making responsibility and accountability difficult. 
To unpack the ethical implications of this at-scale lack of traceability, let us take the example 
of a digital heart-rate monitor that ‘intelligently’ processes biological and environmental data to signal 
to its user their risk of developing a heart condition.  
At the individual LoA this process relies on what can be termed the ‘digital medical gaze’ 
(Morley & Floridi, 2019d) and is based on this micro-cycle of self-reflection adapted from (Garcia, 
Romero, Keyson, & Havinga, 2014):  
1. Gaining Knowledge: Algorithm reads multi-omic dataset to determine risk of heart attack 
and providers individual with a ‘heart health score’  
2. Gaining Awareness: on the advice of the algorithm, individual starts monitoring their 
activity level and becomes aware of how active they are 
3. Self-reflection: as directed by the algorithm the individual reflects on how much high fat 
food they are eating in a day and compares this to their optimal diet based on their 
genomic profile and their level of activity  
4. Action: individual takes the advice of the algorithm and takes specific actions to improve 
their heart-health score e.g. starts regular exercise.  
If this does not work, and the individual still ends up experiencing heart failure, this process of 
algorithmic surveillance (Rich & Miah, 2014) risk creating an elaborate mechanism for victim-blaming 
(Danis & Solomon, 2013; McLaughlin, 2016). The individual may be seen as being a ‘bad user’ for 
failing to act upon the allegedly objective and evidence-based advice of the algorithm (see section 3.1), 
and may therefore be framed as being morally responsible for their poor health and not deserving of 
state-provided healthcare. Yet, due to the lack of traceability, there can be no certainty that the poor 
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outcome was due to the lack of action by the individual: it could be a faulty device, buggy code, or the 
result of biased datasets (Topol, 2019). Moreover, even if a negative outcome were to result purely 
from an individual disregarding the guidance, the adoption of digital infrastructure that enables failure 
to be ascribed to a morally ‘culpable’ individual is itself a matter of ethical concern. These new insights 
may enable lives to be saved and quality of life to be drastically improved, yet they also shift the ethical 
burden of ‘living well’ squarely onto newly accountable individuals. The ontological shift that this new 
infrastructure permits — from individuals-as-patients deserving quality healthcare, regardless of their 
prior choices as fallible humans, to individuals-as-agents expected to take active steps to pre-empt 
negative outcomes — raises stark questions for bioethics, which has traditionally been seen as an 
“ethics of the receiver” (Floridi 2008). Moreover, these technological changes might prompt a shift in 
the ethical framework, burdening the individuals, while not providing de facto means of behavioural 
change. Many concerns stem from socio-demographic issues which entail harmful habits, and cannot 
oversimplified to a matter of delivering the adequate information to the patient (Owens & Cribb, 
2019). 
 Due to issues of bias (discussed further in section 3.2), there is, further, a group LoA ethical 
risk that some groups may come to be seen as being more morally irresponsible about their healthcare 
than others. Heart-rate monitors, for example, are notoriously less accurate for those with darker skin 
(Hailu, 2019), meaning that they could give considerably less accurate advice to people of colour than 
to those with light skin. If this results in people of colour being less able to use AI-Health advice to 
improve their heart-health, then these groups of people may be seen as morally reprehensible when it 
comes to their health. Furthermore, the healthcare could then ‘learn’ to predict that people of colour 
have worse heart-health, potentially resulting in these groups of individuals being discriminated against 
by, for example, insurers (Martani, Shaw, & Elger, 2019).  
At the interpersonal, institutional and sectoral LoAs, this moral responsibility translates 
into liability. If for example, instead of the heart-health algorithm providing the advice back to the 
individual, it provides the data to the individual’s HCP and the HCP provides advice that either fails 
to prevent an adverse event or directly causes an adverse event, this could be the basis of a medical 
malpractice suit (Price, 2018). In this scenario, it remains unclear where the liability will eventually sit 
(Ngiam & Khor, 2019). Current law implies that the HCP would be at fault, and therefore liable, for 
an adverse event as the algorithm in this scenario would be considered a diagnostic support tool – just 
like a blood test – with no decision making capacity, so it is the HCP’s responsibility to act 
appropriately based on the information provided (Price, Gerke, & Cohen, 2019; Schönberger, 2019; 
Sullivan & Schweikart, 2019). However, the supply chain for any clinical algorithm is considerably 
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more complex and less transparent than that of a more traditional diagnostic tool meaning that many 
are questioning whether this is actually how the law will be interpreted in the future. For example, does 
the liability really sit with the HCP for not questioning the results of the algorithm, even if they were 
not able to evaluate the quality of the diagnostic against other sources of information, including their 
own personal knowledge of the patient due to the black-box nature of the algorithm itself? And what 
about the role of the hospital or care facility: does it have a responsibility to put in place a policy 
allowing HCPs to overrule algorithmic advice when this seems indicated? Similarly, what role do 
commissioners or retailers of the device that contains the algorithm play? Do they not carry some 
responsibility for not checking its accuracy, or do they assume that this responsibility sits with the 
regulator (for example MHRA in the UK, the FDA in the US or the CFDA in China) who should, 
therefore, carry the burden for not appropriately assessing the product before it was deployed in the 
market? What if the problem is further back in the chain, stemming from inaccurate coding or poor-
quality training data? There is a clear lack of distributed responsibility (Floridi, 2013, 2016)– a problem 
that is exacerbated by a lack of transparency – making it hard to hold individual parts of the chain 
accountable for poor outcomes which poses a significant ethical risk.  
In their overview of patient-safety issues with AI in healthcare He et al. (2019) state that those 
working in the field are trying to establish a systems-wide approach that does not attribute blame to 
individuals or individual companies, but conclude that where liability will ultimately rest remains to be 
seen. This is problematic because, as Hoffman et al. (2019) stress, uptake of algorithmic-decision-
making tools by the clinical community is highly unlikely until this liability question is resolved (Vayena 
et al., 2018), which could result in the overarching ethical concern raised in the introduction – that of 
a significant missed opportunity. Many, including (Holzinger et al., 2019) believe that explainability is 
the answer to solving this problem and that, if HCPs can understand how a decision was reached, then 
reflecting on the output of an algorithm is no different from any other diagnostic tool. Indeed 
Schönberger (2019) argues that legally this is the case and that as long as it can be proven that the duty 
of care was met, then harm caused to a patient by an erroneous prediction of an AI-Health system 
would not yet constitute medical negligence but that it might in the near future constitute negligence to 
not rely on the algorithmic output – which brings us back to the issues outlined in section 3.1. 
Overall, this lack of clarity will continue to persist for some time (Schönberger, 2019), making 
it once again a social issue. Society will ultimately dictate what the socially acceptable and socially 
preferable (Floridi & Taddeo, 2016) answers are to these pressing questions. The ethical issue is 
whether all parts of society will have an equal say in this debate, as in the example of citizens’ juries 
above, or whether it will be those individuals or groups with the loudest voices that get to set the rules. 
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As (Beer, 2017) attests, when thinking about the power of an algorithm, we need to think beyond the 
impact and consequences of the code, to the powerful ways in which notions and ideas about the 
algorithm circulate throughout the social world.  
 





















Waste of funds 
and resources not 
directed to areas 
























of self  
Deskilling of 
HCPs, overreliance 









groups seen as 
being less 
healthy or 
higher risk  
Transformation 
of care pathways 
& imposing of 
specific values at 
scale – redefining 
‘good care’  
Siloing of 










could come to 
be blamed for 
their own ill-
health 
See institutional Specific groups 
framed as being 
more morally 
irresponsible 
with regards to 
their health than 
others 
Lack of clarity 
over liability with 
regards to issues 




result in certain 
groups being 
blamed more 

















not be given 
an equal say in 
this process 
Table 3:  summary of the epistemic, normative and overarching ethical concerns associated with AI-Health at the five different LoAs as 
identified by the literature review 
 
 
4.The Need for an Ethically-Mindful and Proportionate Approach  
The literature surveyed in this review clearly indicates the need for an agreed pro-ethical blueprint for 
AI-Health that considers the epistemic, normative and traceability ethical concerns at the five different 
LoAs. Protecting people from the harms of AI-Health goes beyond protecting data collection and 
applying a valid model. Normative frameworks need to contemplate the complexities of the human 
interactions where these technologies will be introduced and their emotional impacts (Luxton, 2014; 
Riek, 2016).  
Importantantly, an adequate normative framework should deal with the key question related 
to liability allocation in cases of medical error. Much of the risk of handling data and algorithms stems 
from professionals not adopting measures to protect privacy and support cybersecurity. The solution 
of risk management will come not only from drawing the boundaries of responsibility, but also 
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promoting capacitation, understanding and interfaces for handling AI tools. For one, promoting 
doctors’ and patients’ understanding and control over how AI-Health produces predictions or 
recommendations that are used in treatment plans, and access to and protection of patient data (Ngiam 
& Khor, 2019). Also, there needs to be control over how the interface and design of AI-Health 
products influences HCP-patient-artificial-agent interactions (Cohen et al., 2014). Finally, a 
certification for professionals seeking to use AI-Health tools is also necessary for the adequate 
implementation and use of AI (Kluge, Lacroix, & Ruotsalainen, 2018).  
To tackle these challenges, healthcare systems will need to update outdated governance 
mechanisms (policies, standards and regulations). These can be replaced with both hard and soft 
mechanisms, meaning what ought to be done and what may be done based on the existing moral 
obligations (Floridi, 2018), that balance the need to protect individuals from harm, whilst still 
supporting innovation that can deliver genuine system and patient benefit (Morley & Joshi, 2019). In 
short, healthcare systems should not be overly cautious about the adoption of AI-Health solutions, 
but should be mindful of the potential ethical impacts (Floridi, 2019a) so that proportionate 
governance models can be developed (Sethi & Laurie, 2013) which can, in turn, ensure that those 
responsible for ensuring that healthcare systems are held accountable for the delivery of high-quality 
equitable and safe care, can continue to be so.  
What these regulations, standards and policies should cover and how they should be 
developed remain open questions (Floridi, 2017b) which will likely be ‘solved’ multiple times over by 
different healthcare systems operating in different settings. However, in order to lend a more 
systematic approach to addressing these outstanding questions, enabling greater coherence and speed 
in addressing these challenges, in Table 4 below we have assembled a list of essential cross-cutting 
considerations that emerge from our literature review. The table indicates from which aspect of our 





Consideration Key supporting literature Relevant aspects (ascending LoA6) 
The professional skills required of the 
healthcare workforce, including information 
governance skills 
 
(Kluge et al., 2018) Epistemic (A, B, C, F) 
Normative (B, C, D, E) 
Overarching (A, C) 
Which tasks should be delegated to AI-Health 
solutions 
(Di Nucci, 2019) Epistemic (A, B, C, D, F) 
Normative (B, C, D, F) 
Overarching (A, C, D) 
 
What evidence is needed to ‘prove’ clinical 
effectiveness of an AI-Health solution 
(Greaves et al., 2018) Epistemic (A, B, C, E, F) 
Normative (E) 
Overarching (A, C, D, F) 
 
Mechanisms for reporting or seeking redress 
for AI-Health associated harms 
(Schönberger, 2019) Epistemic (A, C, E, F) 
Normative (A, C, E, F) 
Overarching (A, C, D) 
 
Mechanisms for the inclusion of all relevant 
stakeholder views in the development of AI-
Health systems 
 
(Aitken et al., 2019) Epistemic (C, E, F) 
Overarching (A, C, D, F) 
 
Explainability of specific AI-Health decisions (Watson et al., 2019) Epistemic (A, C) 
Normative (A, C, E) 
Overarching (A, D) 
 
Reliability, replicability and safety of AI-
Health solutions 
(Challen et al., 2019) Epistemic (A, C, F) 
Normative (C, E, F) 
Overarching (A, C, D) 
 
Transparency over how algorithmic tools are 
integrated into the healthcare workflow, how 
it shapes decisions, and how it affects process 
optimization within medical services 
 
(Effy Vayena et al., 2015) Epistemic (A, B, C, D, E, F) 
Normative (A, B, D, F) 
Overarching (A, D, F) 
How traditional and non-traditional sources of 
health data can be incorporated into AI-
Health decision making, how it can be 
appropriately protected and how it can be 
harmonised 
 
(e.g. Maher et al., 2019; Ploug & Holm, 
2016; Richardson, Milam, & Chrysler, 
2015; Townend, 2018) 
Epistemic (A, C, D, E, F) 
Normative (A, C, D, E, F) 
Overarching (A, C, D, E) 
How bioethical concepts (beneficence, non-
maleficence, autonomy and justice 
(Beauchamp & Childress, 2013) are challenged 
by AI-Health 
 
(Mittelstadt, 2019) Epistemic (B, F) 
Normative (A, C, D, F) 
Overarching (A, F) 
 
How concepts such as fairness, accountability 
and transparency can be maintained at scale 
(Morley & Floridi, 2019b) so that, for 
example, the output of algorithmic diagnostics 
does not result in economic benefits to 
specific drug producers or technology 
companies 
 
(Rosenfeld et al., 2019) Epistemic (C, D, E, F) 
Normative (D, E, F) 
Overarching (F) 
 
Table 4: the 11 key considerations for policymakers that arose from the literature review.  
 
Awareness of the need to consider these questions is increasing, and efforts are being made at both a 
national and international level to adapt existing regulations so that they remain fit for purpose (The 
 
6 Denoted by an increasing Level of Analysis: Individual (A), Interpersonal (B), Group (C), Institutional (D), 
Sectoral (E) and Societal (F). 
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Lancet Digital Health, 2019). The American Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is now planning 
on regulating Software as a Medical Devices (SaMD) (Food and Drug Administration (FDA), 2019) 
and in both the EU and the UK Regulation 2017/745 on medical devices comes into effect in April 
2020 and significantly increases the range of software and non-medical products that will need to be 
classed (and assessed) as medical devices. Additionally, the UK has published its Code of Conduct for 
data-driven health and care technologies, standards for evidence of clinical effectiveness for digital 
health technologies (Greaves et al., 2018) – a digital assessment questionnaire standards for apps – and 
is currently developing a ‘regulation as a service’ model to ensure that there are appropriate regulatory 
checks at all stages of the AI development cycle (Morley & Joshi, 2019). The World Health 
Organisation has a number of projects under way to develop guidance for member states (Aicardi et 
al., 2016) (World Health Organisation, 2019). In China, several norms7 provide specific and detailed 
instructions to ensure health data security and confidentiality (Wang, 2019) to ensure that health and 
medical big data sets can be used as a national resource to develop algorithms (Zhang et al., 2018) for 
the improvement of public health (Li, Li, Jiang, & Lan, 2019).  
These are all steps in the right direction, however, their development is progressing slowly 
(which is why the relevant literature is unlikely to reflect all current developments) and almost all focus 
solely on interventions positioning themselves as being health-related in the medical sense, not in the 
wider, wellbeing sense, e.g., healthy exercise, diet, sleeping habits). They will not necessarily mitigate 
risks are associated with the expanding wellness industry, which provides algorithmic tools that 
potentially enable people to bypass formal and well-regulated healthcare systems entirely by accessing 
technology directly, either by using a wearable device or consulting online databases (Burr et al., 2019). 
Similarly, although some technical solutions have been put forward for mitigating issues with data bias 
(Gebru et al., 2018; Holland, Hosny, Newman, Joseph, & Chmielinski, 2018) and data quality  (Dai, 
Yoshigoe, & Parsley, 2018) and ensuring social inclusion in decision making (Balthazar et al., 2018; 
Friedman, Hendry, & Borning, 2017; Rahwan, 2018), these remain relatively untested. Unless a 
competitive advantage of taking such pro-ethical steps becomes clear without these approaches being 
made mandatory, it is unlikely that they will have a significant impact on the ethical impacts of AI-
Health in the near future. As a result, there is still little control over the procedures followed and quality 
 
7 Article 6 of the Regulations on the Management of Medical Records of Medical Institutions, Article 8 of the 
Management Regulations on Application of Electronic Medical Records, Article 6 of the Measures for the 
Management of Health Information, the Cybersecurity Law of the People’s Republic of China, and the new 
Personal Information Security Specification. 
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control mechanisms (Cohen et al., 2014) involved in the development, deployment and use of AI-
Health.  
  As these comparatively easier to tackle problems do not yet have adequate solutions, it is 
unsurprising that the bigger issues regarding the protection of equality of care (Powell & Deetjen, 2019, 
fair distribution of benefits (Balthazar et al., 2018) (Kohli & Geis, 2018) and the protection and 
promotion of societal values (Mahomed, 2018) have barely even been considered. Given that 
healthcare systems in many ways act as the core of modern societies this is concerning. If mistakes are 
made too early in the adoption and implementation of AI in healthcare, the fall-out could be significant 
enough to undermine public trust, resulting in significant opportunity costs, and potentially 
encouraging individuals to seek their healthcare from outside of the formal systems where they may 
be presented with even greater risks. A coherent approach is needed and urgently, hopefully this 





This thematic literature review has sought to map out the ethical issues around the incorporation of 
data-driven AI technologies into healthcare provision and public health systems. In order to make this 
overview more useful, the relevant topics have been organised into themes and five different levels of 
abstraction (LoAs) have been highlighted. The hope is that by encouraging a discussion of the ethical 
implications of AI-Health at individual, interpersonal, group, institutional and societal LoAs, 
policymakers and regulators will be able to segment a large and complex conversation into tractable 
debates around specific issues, stakeholders, and solutions. This is important, as Topol (2019) states 
‘there cannot be exceptionalism for AI in medicine,’ especially not when there is potentially so much 
to gain (Miotto, Wang, Wang, Jiang, & Dudley, 2018).  
With this in mind, the review has covered a wide range of topics while also venturing into the 
specificity of certain fields. This approach has made it to develop a fuller and more nuanced 
understanding of the ethical concerns related to the introduction of AI into healthcare systems than 
has been previously seen in the literature. Inevitably, there are limitations to this approach, which are 
specified in the appendix, detailing our methodology and pointing towards opportunities for further 
research. 
In this article, we hope to have provided a sufficiently comprehensive, detailed, and systematic 
analysis of the current debates on ethical issues related to the introduction of AI into healthcare 
systems. The aim is to help policymakers and legislators develop evidence-based and proportionate 
 23 
policy and regulatory interventions. In particular, we hope to encourage the development of a system 
of transparent and distributed responsibility, where all those involved in the clinical algorithm supply 
chain can be held proportionately and appropriately accountable for the safety of the patient at the 
end, not just the HCP. It is only by ensuring such a system is developed that policymakers and 
legislators can be confident that the inherent risks we have described are appropriately mitigated (as 
far as possible) and only once this is the case will the medical community at large feel willing and able 





Appendix – Methodology 
 
The data collection for this research was divided into three stages as outlined in the below schematic. 
 
 
This process resulted in approximately 147 papers suitable for analysis and inclusion in the 
initial review. Subsequent relevant papers that met the criteria were added at a later date during the 
writing up of the results.  
This literature review also included accessory readings and case studies that were 
encountered during the research process. This includes bibliography obtained from the references of 
the papers analysed, and case studies identified in the readings (e.g. the Deep Mind case study). It is 
our belief that these exploratory readings enrich our systematic approach by developing on 
interesting findings and topics identified throughout our investigation. 
It is important to note that the selection of articles and policy documents was restricted to 
those written in English. This means that some ethical issues will have been overlooked (e.g. those in 
Spanish-speaking countries or in China). Second, academic literature, much like regulation, tends to 
struggle to keep pace with technological development. This literature review did not seek to identify 
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ethical issues associated with specific use cases of AI first-hand, for example, by reviewing recently 
published studies available on pre-print servers such as arXiv, but instead focused on providing an 
overview of the ethical issues already identified. As a result, there may well be ethical concerns that 
are associated with more emergent use cases of AI for healthcare that we have not identified as they 
have not yet been discussed in formal peer-reviewed publications.  
To overcome these limitations, further research could seek to expand the literature review 
by including a wider range of search queries, and by taking a case-study approach to analysing the 
ethical issues of specific practices and then aggregating these. This could be complemented by a 
comprehensive review of the policies, standards and regulations in development in different 
healthcare systems across the globe to assess the extent to which these are likely to be effective at 
mitigating these ethical concerns.  
 
 
Technology Ethics/Concerns Field  
Algorithm* Fairness Health* 
Artificial Intelligence / AI Moral* 
Machine Learning Ethics 
Governance 
Table 5: Showing terms refined from Mittelstadt et al (2016) and selected to focus the literature 
search on publications focusing specifically on the ethics of AI for health. It is important to note that 
the search parameters were not exactly the same in all databases. Adaptation was necessary since not 
all databases operated with the same syntax or accepted the same number of search queries. As a 
result, the arrangement of Boolean operators and a search parameter were adapted to ensure that all 
possible combinations were covered. 
 
 
Database Search Query Results Titles 
Selected 
Titles Downloaded 
SCOPUS ethic* AND algorithm* AND health* 596 39 19 
 (ethic* AND ( "Artificial 
Intelligence"  OR  ai )  AND  health* )  
239 37 15 
 ( moral*  AND  ( "Artificial 
Intelligence"  OR  ai )  AND  health* )  
46 2 0 
 ( fair*  AND  ( "Artificial 
Intelligence"  OR  ai )  AND  health* )  
122 6 3 
 (moral* OR ethic*) AND "machine learning" AND 
health* 
91 14 9 
  ( fair* )  AND  "machine learning"  AND  health* )  70 5 3 
Web of Science ((fair* OR moral* OR ethic*) AND ("machine learning" 
OR "Artificial Intelligence" OR "AI" OR algorithm*) 
AND health*) 
668 45 26 
Philpapers '"machine learning" AND health* 3 1 1 
 Artificial Intelligence AND health* AND ethic* 1000+ - - 
 algorithm* AND health* AND ethic* 5 0 0 
 ethics AND "artificial intelligence" AND health 3 2 2 
 AI or Artificial Intelligence or Fair AND ethic or moral or 
health AND health8 
9 0 0 
Google Scholar ethics algorithms health 15,400 18 18 
 ethics of machine learning in health 21,300 11 10 
 ETHICS & HEALTH  
and at least one of: 
 algorithm OR machine learning OR artificial intelligence 
OR AI 
 




 ETHICS & HEALTH  
and at least one of: 
algorithm OR AI 
 
105,000 2 2 
 MORAL & HEALTH  
and at least one of: 
algorithm OR AI 
26,900 2 1 
 FAIR & HEALTH 
And at least one of: 
 algorithm OR AI 
38,000 0 0 
PubMed ETHICS & ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE OR 
MACHINE LEARNING  
34, 193 37 37 
 
Table 6: Showing the final results from all searches. It is important to note that multiple search 
queries were made to cover all the combinations and the numbers in the table thus represent the sum 
of results, titles evaluated and downloaded (not all found files were accessible for download). It is 
also important to note that only the first 500 most relevant results from Google Scholar were 
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